

China’s rise is the story of the future.īeijing’s unsubtlety in its efforts to score points off tragedy likely will diminish their impact. Afghanistan is but another way station on America’s path of decline. Unlike Washington, Beijing will not intervene in other country’s civil wars, spill blood, and leave messes behind.īy Vanda Felbab-Brown Foreword by Bruce Riedel 2012įor an international audience, the message likely will be that America’s best days are behind it. These efforts likely will seek to reach two audiences: a domestic one and an international (non-American) one.įor the domestic audience, Beijing’s message will be that the United States is not an object of worship. Chinese propaganda officials likely will seek to exploit tragic images of America’s abandonment of Afghan partners as proof points of American unreliability and incompetence. The principal means through which China may seek to profit from America’s withdrawal might be its efforts to advance a narrative of American decline. How will China respond to America’s withdrawal? Beijing likely will take the time necessary to gain confidence that its defensive security requirements are met before it attempts to advance its affirmative interests in Afghanistan. Beijing’s lack of development at its major investment in the Mes Aynak copper mine demonstrates its willingness to exercise patience in pursuit of return on investment. Over time, China would welcome opportunities to benefit from Afghanistan’s rich mineral deposits and incorporate Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative, but it likely has learned from America’s experience that even modest expectations in Afghanistan must be tempered. Beijing will urge the Taliban to deny safe haven to Uyghur fighters and other groups that could destabilize Central Asia or harm Chinese interests in the region or at home. Beijing will recognize the Taliban and seek ways to encourage the Taliban to be attentive to China’s security concerns. They also worry about the inspiration that Islamic militarism could provide to others with similar aspirations.Īlthough Chinese leaders are not enthusiastic about the Taliban taking over Afghanistan, they will not allow principle to stand in the way of pragmatism, as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s hosting of Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Tianjin three weeks ago signaled. Chinese leaders worry about the spread of instability from Afghanistan into adjacent regions, including spillover into China. Beijing is master only of its own interests in Afghanistan, which are predominantly animated by security concerns. They harbor no ambition to run Afghanistan or to turn Afghanistan into a model of their own form of governance. Most Chinese counterparts I know are unclouded by any optimism about their capacity to transform Afghanistan. Does China see an opportunity to exploit in Afghanistan following America’s withdrawal?

The following observations are based on over a decade of discussions with Chinese officials and experts focused on such questions. While it is difficult to know with certainty how China’s leaders are evaluating developments in Afghanistan, it is possible to draw a few preliminary conclusions.
